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Heald: Exhaustion of State Administrative Remedies in a Prerequisite to

CIVIL RIGHTS-Exhaustion of Remedies-Exhaustion of State
Administrative Remedies is a Prerequisite to 42 U.S.C. §
1983 Action.
Patsy v. Florida International University 634 F.2d 900 (5th Cir. 1981),
cert. granted, 50 U.S.L.W. 3213 (U.S. Oct. 6, 1981) (No. 80-1874).
Patsy was a white female secretary employed at Florida International
University. She had applied for several promotions, each of which was
rejected. Contending the denials were based on race and sex discrimination, she brought a civil rights action against the Florida State Board of
Regents. 1 The district court granted the university's motion to dismiss
because of Patsy's failure to exhaust available state administrative reme3
dies.2 The Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit reversed and remanded.
Subsequently, the court of appeals, en banc, granted a rehearing to determine if exhaustion of state administrative remedies was a prerequisite for
federal court consideration of a section 1983 action. 4 Held-Vacated and
remanded. Exhaustion of state administrative remedies is a prerequisite
to a 42 U.S.C. § 1983 action.5
Administrative acts are the legislature's vehicle for implementing policy.' Exhaustion of administrative remedies7 has enabled administrative
1. Patsy v. Florida Int'l Univ., 634 F.2d 900, 902 (5th Cir. 1981), cert. granted, 50
U.S.L.W. 3213 (U.S. Oct. 6, 1981) (No. 80-1874). Patsy brought her civil rights action under
42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1976). Section 1983 is a codification of the Civil Rights Act of 1871 and
provides:
Every person, who under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, custom, or usage,
of any state or territory, subjects, or causes to be subjected, any citizen of the United
States or any other person within the jurisdiction thereof to the deprivation of any
rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws, shall be liable
to the party injured at action at law, suit in equity, or other proper proceeding for
redress.
Civil Rights Act of 1871 §§ 1, 17, 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1976).As a result of the alleged discrimination, Patsy sought promotion to a higher position or an award of $50,000.00 for actual and
punitive damages. See Patsy v. Florida Int'l Univ., 634 F.2d 900, 902 (5th Cir. 1981), cert.
granted, 50 U.S.L.W. 3213 (U.S. Oct. 6, 1981) (No. 80-1874).
2. See Patsy v. Florida Int'l Univ., 634 F.2d 900, 902 (5th Cir. 1981), cert. granted, 50
U.S.L.W. 3213 (U.S. Oct. 6, 1981) (No. 80-1874).
3. See Patsy v. Florida Int'l Univ., 612 F.2d 946, 946-47 (5th Cir. 1980) (reversed on
grounds plaintiff need not exhaust state administrative remedies prior to § 1983 suits).
4. See Patsy v. Florida Int'l Univ., 634 F.2d 900, 902 (5th Cir. 1981), cert. granted, 50
U.S.L.W. 3213 (U.S. Oct. 6, 1981) (No. 80-1874).
5. See id. at 912-14.
6. See McKevitt v.City of Sacramento, 203 P. 132, 136 (Cal. Ct. App. 1921). Executive
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agencies to fulfill legislative intent while conserving judicial resources.'
The federal judiciary has, therefore, generally required exhaustion of
state administrative remedies before allowing a plaintiff to proceed in
federal court.'
The United States Supreme Court, however, has stated that exhaustion
of state administrative remedies is not required in civil rights actions.10 In
Monroe v. Pape," the Court reasoned that federal remedies were supplementary to state remedies; therefore, exhaustion of state judicial remedies
was not required in actions brought under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.12 Subse-

departments initiate and enforce legislative policies, thus creating the administrative process. See id. at 136; cf Honolulu Rapid Transit & Land Co. v. Hawaii, 211 U.S. 282, 291
(1908) (legislature may delegate to administrative agency power of regulation); Commonwealth v. Benn, 131 A. 253, 257 (Pa. 1925) (administrative bodies necessary to carry out
public policy of legislature).
7. See Myers v. Bethlehem Shipbuilding Corp., 303 U.S. 41, 50-51 (1938). The Court
stated the exhaustion requirement provides "that no one is entitled to judicial relief for a
supposed or threatened injury until the prescribed administrative remedy has been exhausted." Id. at 50-51.
8. See, e.g., Parisi v. Davidson, 405 U.S. 34, 37 (1972); McKart v. United States, 395
U.S. 185, 193-95 (1969); Myers v. Bethlehem Shipbuilding Corp., 303 U.S. 41, 50-51 (1938).
See generally Developments in the Law -Section 1983, and Federalism,90 HARv. L. REv.
1133, 1265-66 (1977).
9. See, e.g., McKart v. United States, 395 U.S. 185, 193 (1969) (well established rule
administrative remedy must be exhausted before judicial relief sought); Franklin v. Jonco
Aircraft Corp., 346 U.S. 868, 868 (1953) (per curiam) (lower court decision reversed for appellee's failure to exhaust administrative remedies); Myers v. Bethlehem Shipbuilding
Corp., 303 U.S. 41, 50-51 (1938) (no judicial relief for real or impending injury until administrative remedies exhausted).
10. See, e.g., Ellis v. Dyson, 421 U.S. 426, 432-33 (1975) (exhaustion of state administrative remedy not necessary in § 1983 action); Steffel v. Thompson, 415 U.S. 452, 472-73
(1974) (Congress established federal judiciary as protector of constitutional rights and thus
no requirement to exhaust state administrative remedies); Damico v. California, 389 U.S.
416, 417 (1967) (per curiam) (relief under Civil Rights Act may be sought first in federal
court). But see, e.g., City of Columbus v. Leonard, 443 U.S. 905 (1979) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting) (no-exhaustion rule in § 1983 action should be reconsidered); Runyon v. McCrary,
427 U.S. 160, 186 n.*a (1976) (Powell, J., concurring) (extreme interpretation of post Civil
War acts do not require exhaustion of state administrative remedies in § 1983 claims); Gibson v. Berryhill, 411 U.S. 564, 574-75 (1973) (question whether state administrative remedies need be exhausted undecided).
11. 365 U.S. 167 (1961).
12. Id. at 183. The Court in Monroe reasoned the purpose of the Civil Rights Act of
1871 was to enforce the provisions of the fourteenth amendment. See id. at 171 (construing
title of Civil Rights Act of 1871); CONG. GLOBE, 42d Cong., 1st Sess. 83-85 (1871) (Civil
Rights Act carries out powers of fourteenth amendment). Section 1 of the Civil Rights Act
of 1871 provides redress in federal courts for citizens deprived of rights under the color of
state law. 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1976); see, e.g., Wilwording v. Swenson, 404 U.S. 249, 249-51
(1971) (prisoners filed suit against state prison officials because of living conditions and disciplinary measures); King v. Smith, 392 U.S. 309, 311 (1968) (class action seeking declara-

https://commons.stmarytx.edu/thestmaryslawjournal/vol13/iss2/6

2

Heald: Exhaustion of State Administrative Remedies in a Prerequisite to

1981].

CASENOTES

3 the Court extended the
quently, in McNeese v. Board of Education,"
Monroe no-exhaustion rule to state administrative remedies.' The Court
has continued to adhere to the no-exhaustion concept, but has excused
exhaustion on grounds other than section 1983 principles.' Since
McNeese, exhaustion of state administrative remedies has been excused
when one of the following circumstances exist: the administrative remedy
is inadequate, 6 the case involves a constitutional question,' the ade-

tory and injunctive relief against state officials); Damico v. California, 389 U.S. 416, 416
(1967) (per curiam) (class action seeking declaratory and injunctive relief against state welfare law). Congress has thus established, through the fourteenth amendment, a federal remedy for civil rights litigants supplemental to state remedies. See Monroe v. Pape, 365 U.S.
167, 183 (1961).
13. 373 U.S. 668 (1963).
14. See id. at 671 (black students alleging racial discrimination against Illinois public
school system). The McNeese Court held that when citizens are deprived of rights protected
by the fourteenth amendment "it is -immaterial whether respondent's conduct is legal or
illegal as a matter of state law." Id. at 671; See Stapelton v. Mitchell, 60 F. Supp. 51, 55,
appeal dismissed, sub. nom., pursuant to stipulation, 326 U.S. 690, 690 (1945). Before
McNeese, civil rights litigants did not have to exhaust judicial remedies in all cases, but
they did have to exhaust all state administrative remedies. See Dove v. Parham, 282 F.2d
256, 262 (8th Cir. 1960) (state administrative but not judicial remedies must be exhausted
before access to federal forum); Baron v. O'Sullivan, 258 F.2d 336, 37 (3d Cir. 1958) (state
administrative not judicial remedies must be exhausted for abridgement of constitutional'
rights).
15. See, e.g., Barry v. Barchi, 443 U.S. 55, 63 n.10 (1979); Gibson v. Berryhill, 411 U.S.
564, 574-75 (1973); Wilwording v. Swenson, 404 U.S. 249, 250 (1971) (per curiam). The majority in Gibson acknowledged that exhaustion of state administrative remedies is not required in section 1983 actions, but questioned the cogency and construction of prior section
1983 decisions. See Gibson v. Berryhill, 411 U.S. 564, 581 (1973) (Burger, J., concurring)
(Marshall, Brennan, J.J., concurring). In his concurring opinion, Chief Justice Burger would
have withheld judgment until further exhaustion of state remedies. Id. at 581 (Burger, J.,
concurring). Justice Marshall, with whom Justice Brennan concurred, stated that the question of whether section 1983 plaintiffs must exhaust administrative remedies is still open.
See id. at 581 (Marshall, J., concurring). Other Supreme Court opinions contain statements
which question the no-exhaustion rule in section 1983 actions. See, e.g., City of Columbus v.
Leonard, 443 U.S. 905, 910-11 (1979) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting) (purposes of Civil Rights
Act need not bar exhaustion of adequate and available state remedies); Runyon v. McCrary,
427 U.S. 160, 186 (1976) (Powell, J., concurring) (no exhaustion requirement is extreme interpretation of post-Civil War Act); Gibson v. Berryhill, 411 U.S. 564, 574-75 (1973) (question of exhaustion requirements is still open); cf. Paul v. Davis, 424 U.S. 693, 712 (1976)
(Court relies on available state judicial tort remedies rather than allowing § 1983 action).
But see, e.g., Ellis v. Dyson, 421 U.S. 426, 432-33 (1975) (exhaustion of state administrative
remedy not necessary in § 1983 action); Steffel v. Thompson, 415 U.S. 452, 472-73 (1974)
(Congress established federal judiciary as protector of constitutional rights thus no need to
exhaust state administrative remedies); Wilwording v. Swenson, 404 U.S. 249, 251 (1971)
(per curiam) (claim brought under Civil Rights Act does not require exhaustion).
16. See Walker v. Southern Ry., 385 U.S. 196, 198-99 (1966); United States v. Joseph A.
Holpuch Co., 328 U.S. 234, 240 (1946); United States Alkali Export Ass'n v. United States,
325 U.S. 196, 210 (1945).
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quacy of the administrative remedy is coextensive with the merits of the

plaintiff's claim, 18 or it is futile to comply with administrative remedies."

Nevertheless, the Supreme Court has not expressly prohibited lower
courts from applying their own exhaustion rules.2
Lower federal courts are divided on the issue of section 1983 exhaustion
requirements.2 Courts opposing the exhaustion requirement reason that

the legislative intent in creating section 1983 was to establish federal rem-

edies in civil rights actions as a supplement to state remedies.2 2 Propo-

nents of the no-exhaustion view argue civil rights questions are best resolved by the experts of the Constitution, the federal courts.2 s Moreover,
the delays associated with the exhaustion of state remedies is said to have

17. See Public Utilities Comm'n v. United States, 355 U.S. 534, 539 (1958).
18. See Gibson v. Berryhill, 411 U.S. 564, 575 (1973); Fuentes v. Roher, 519 F.2d 379,
387 (2d Cir. 1975); Finnerty v. Cowen, 508 F.2d 979, 982-83 (2d Cir. 1974).
19. See City Bank Farmers Trust Co. v. Schnader, 291 U.S. 24, 34 (1934); Montana
Nat'l Bank v. Yellowstone County, 276 U.S. 499, 505 (1928).
20. See, e.g., Secret v. Brierton, 584 F.2d 823, 827-28 (7th Cir. 1978) (Supreme Court
retains flexible approach to exhaustion requirement; any intimation towards inflexible rule
is dicta); Canton v. Spokane School Dist. #81, 498 F.2d .840, 844 (9th Cir. 1974) (Court
never stated state administrative remedies need not be exhausted under any circumstances);
Eisen v. Eastman, 421 F.2d 560, 569 (2d Cir. 1969) (court needs clearer directions from
Supreme Court before eliminating all exhaustion requirements), cert. denied, 400 U.S. 841
(1970).
21. Seven circuits do not require exhaustion of state remedies. See Davis v. Southeastern Community College, 574 F.2d 1158, 1160 n.4 (4th Cir. 1978), rev'd on other grounds, 442
U.S. 397 (1979); Green v. Ten Eyck, 572 F,2d 1233, 1239 (8th Cir. 1978); United States ex
rel. Ricketts v. Lightcap, 567 F.2d 1226, 1229 (3rd Cir. 1977); Wells Fargo Armored Serv.
Corp. v. Georgia Pub. Serv. Comm'n, 547 F.2d 938, 939 n.1 (5th Cir. 1977); Gillette v. McNichols, 517 F.2d 888, 890 (10th Cir. 1975); Guerro v. Mulhearn, 498 F.2d 1249, 1252 (1st
Cir. 1974); Jones v. Metzger, 456 F.2d 854, 856 (6th Cir. 1972). The remaining circuits do
require exhaustion of state remedies. See Secret v. Brierton, 584 F.2d 823, 831 (7th Cir.
1978); Gonzalez v. Shanker, 533 F.2d 832, 833-34 (2d Cir. 1976); Canton v. Spokane School
Dist. #81, 498 F.2d 840, 844-45 (9th Cir. 1974).
22. See, e.g., United States ex. rel. Ricketts v. Lightcap, 567 F.2d 1226, 1229 (3rd Cir.
1977); Hardwick v. Ault, 517 F.2d 295, 297 (5th Cir. 1975); Guerro v. Mulhearn, 498 F.2d
1249, 1252 (1st Cir. 1974).
23. See Comment, Exhaustion of State Remedies Under the Civil Rights Act, 68 COL.
L. REV. 1201, 1207-08 (1968); Comment, Exhaustion of State Administrative Remedies
Under the Civil Rights Act, 8 IND. L. REV. 565, 586-88 (1975); cf. Stone v. Powell, 428 U.S.
465, 530 (1976) (Brennan, J., dissenting) (federal judges to be relied on for vindicating constitutional rights). In addition to constitutional law expertise, the federal judges with life
tenure are less likely to be influenced by community pressures. See, e.g., Palmore v. United
States, 411 U.S. 389, 412 (1973) (Douglas, J., dissenting) (life tenure safeguards judge from
external pressures); Chicago Council of Lawyers v. Bauer, 522 F.2d 242, 257 (7th Cir. 1975)
(life tenure sufficient to insulate judges from public opinion); United States v. Montanez,
371 F.2d 79, 84 n.17 (2d Cir. 1967) (federal judges independent of outside influence because
of life tenure).
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a "chilling effect" on section 1983 suits."' Other courts, however, argue

exhaustion of state administrative remedies will ameliorate both the judicial and administrative process. 5 Advocates of the pro-exhaustion rule
contend exhaustion does not abuse legislative intent.26 Courts which have
adopted the rule requiring exhaustion of administrative remedies in section 1983 actions reason that mere postponement of an individual's right
to proceed in federal court is harmless in its effect."7
The Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals in Patsy v. Florida International
University' s reasoned that recent Supreme Court decisions provide sufficient latitude to sanction "an analytical rather than a mechanical approach" to exhaustion questions and, thus, require exhaustion of state
administrative remedies in section 1983 actions.2 9 The court noted its de-

cision would bolster, rather than contravene, congressional aims. 0 The
majority listed several policy reasons for their decisions.2 " First, exhaustion promotes a wiser allocation of judicial resources.32 Second, exhaus-

24. See Riley v. Ambach, 508 F. Supp. 1222, 1236 (E.D.N.Y. 1980) (long process may
cause irreparable harm).
25. See, e.g., Secret v. Brierton, 584 F.2d 823, 829 (7th Cir. 1978) (administrative procedure provides written record and provides speedier trial); Eisen v. Eastman, 421 F.2d 560,
567 n.11 (2d Cir. 1969) (exhaustion reduces official abuse and costly trials); Powell v. Workmens' Compensation Bd., 327 F.2d 131, 137 (2d Cir. 1964) (flood of litigation from failure to
exhaust state remedies).
26. See Comment, Exhaustion of State Administrative Remedies in 1983 Cases, 41 U.
CHi. L. REV. 537, 552-54 (1974).
27. See Morgan v. Lavallee, 526 F.2d 221, 226 (2d Cir. 1975) (delay harmless if "speedy,
sufficient and readily available" administrative remedy open). But see Smith v. Illinois Bell
Tel. Co., 270 U.S. 587, 591 (1926) (unreasonable delay same effect as express act).
28. 634 F.2d 900 (5th Cir. 1981), cert. granted, 50 U.S.L.W. 3213 (U.S. Oct. 6, 1981)
(No. 80-1874).
29. See id. at 908. The court based this flexible approach on the Supreme Court's reasoning in Barry v. Barchi and Gibson v. BerryhiU. See id. at 905-06; cf Barry v. Barchi, 443
U.S. 55, 63 n. 10 (1979) (exhaustion not required because of available traditional exception);
Gibson v. Berryhill, 411 U.S. 564, 574-75 (1973) (question of exhuastion requirement still
open). The use of this analytical approach will require exhaustion of adequate and appropriate state administrative agencies before a section 1983 claim will be heard in the federal
forum. See id. at 908.
30. Patsy v. Florida Intn'l University, 634 F.2d 900, 910 (5th Cir. 1981), cert. granted,
50 U.S.L.W. 3213 (U.S. Oct. 6, 1981) (No. 80-1874). The court discussed three major reasons
for the enactment of the Civil Rights Acts of 1871. These reasons are: (1) to dominate state
laws which contradicted federal laws, (2) to provide a federal law where state law is inadequate, and (3) provide a federal remedy where a state remedy is available in theory, but not
in fact. Id. at 910. The legislative intent will be fulfilled for two reasons. First, the requirement to exhaust state administrative remedies will expose inept administrators. Second, the
legislation was aimed only at inadequate remedies, therefore, adequate remedies should be
exhausted. Id. at 910-12.
31. See id. at 910-11.
32. See id. at 911.
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tion assures the action is ripe for adjudication and improves the administrative process.3 3 Third, since administrative remedies are generally
simpler, speedier, and cheaper"' civil rights litigants benefit from exhaustion. Finally, exhaustion preserves the concepts of a dual constitutional
government.15 The court of appeals ultimately emphasized its ruling was
procedural in nature and did not pertain to the substantive rights which
were the foundation of section 1983.36
The dissent argued there was insufficient justification in recent Supreme Court decisions to support the majority's departure from precedent. 7 Furthermore, compelling the exhaustion of state administrative
remedies thwarts the legislative intent of section 1983.38 The dissent attacked the majority's failure to consider a major reason for enacting section 1983-to insure the civil rights litigant a supplemental federal remedy.39 The dissent believed the majority's opinion would encroach on the
legislative function assigned to Congress, 0 and concluded the holding

33. See id. at 911.
34. See id. at 911.
35. See id. at 911-12.
36. See id. at 912. The court also emphasized that certain minimum requirements must
be met before state administrative proceedings are exhausted. See id. at 912-13. Such minimum requirements include a documented and orderly system of review which provides relief
within a minimum period of time. See id. at 912. The standards must insure the relief will
be commensurate with the claim. See id. at 912. Review procedures must be fair and not
used to harass those with legitimate claims. See id. at 912-13. Finally, interim relief must be
available to prevent irreparable harm. See id. at 912-13.
37. See id. at 917 (Hatchett, J., dissenting). Unequivocal statements in several Supreme
Court decisions that exhaustion is not required led the dissent to state: "We must not presume that the Supreme Court makes meaningless, gratuitous statements. Instead, we must
give deference to its repeated, unequivocal declaration that exhaustion is not required in
section 1983 cases." Id. at 917 (Hatchett, J., dissenting). The dissent reasoned that the
Court has maintained a firm stance on its no exhaustion requirement in section 1983 actions. Id. at 917. See, e.g., Ellis v. Dyson, 421 U.S.. 426, 432-33 (1975) (action under § 1983
free of exhaustion); Allee v. Medrano, 416 U.S. 802, 814 (1974) (no requirement to exhaust
under Civil Rights Act); Steffel v. Thompson, 415 U.S. 452, 472 (1974) (federal claims under
§ 1983 do not require exhaustion).
38. See Patsy v. Florida Intn'l University, 634 F.2d 900, 910 (5th Cir. 1981) (Hatchett,
J., dissenting), cert. granted, 50 U.S.L.W. 3213 (U.S. Oct. 6, 1981) (No. 80-1874). (Hatchett,
J., dissenting).
39. See id. at 919 (Hatchett, J. dissenting). The minority conceded that some purposes
of the Civil Rights Act may be met by requiring exhaustion of state administrative remedies. See id. at 919 (Hatchett, J., dissenting). In Monroe, there was no indication state laws
were inadequate. See Monroe v. Pape, 365 U.S. 167, 183 (1961). The majority in Monroe,
therefore, reasoned that the federal remedy is completely independent of state remedies in
section 1983 actions. See id. at 183; Patsy v. Florida Int'l Univ., 634 F.2d 900, 919 (5th Cir.
1981) (Hatchett, J., dissenting), cert. granted, 50 U.S.L.W. 3213 (U.S. Oct. 6, 1981) (No. 801874).
40. See Patsy v. Florida Int'l Univ., 634 F.2d 900, 924-25 (5th Cir. 1981) (Hatchett, J.,
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1
would have a "chilling effect" on future civil rights litigation.4

The Patsy majority's interpretion of two recent Supreme Court decisions"' is inconsistent with the Court's repeated denial of a mechanical
approach to section 1983 exhaustion requirements.' Although the Supreme Court's reliance on a traditional exception to exhaustion in Barry
v. Barchi" implicitly suggested the Court required exhaustion in section
1983 actions, 5 the Barry Court did not confront the issue of whether exhaustion of state administrative remedies is required in section 1983 actions.46 Similarly, the Patsy majority's reliance on Gibson v. Berryhill'7 is
misplaced in that the Gibson Court expressly refused to decide the exhaustion question." Contrary to Patsy, the Supreme Court has uniformly
asserted that the federal courts are designed to protect constitutional
rights; thus, exhaustion of state remedies is not required in section 1983
9
actions.4

dissenting), cert. granted, 50 U.S.L.W. 3213 (U.S. Oct. 6, 1981) (No. 80-1874). The dissent
reasoned Congress enacted section 1983 to protect citizens from state discriminatory abuses
by creating a separate and independent remedy outside the control of the states. The Civil
Rights Act of 1871 was developed from exhaustive public debate and findings. The Act,
therefore, should only be altered or modified by legislation and not judicial fiat. See id. at
925 (Hatchett, J., dissenting).
41. See id. at 926 (Hatchett, J., dissenting). Civil rights litigants will be provided a
more swift, less expensive, and more reliable remedy, if they are allowed immediate access
to the federal forum. See id. at 916 (Rubin, J., dissenting).
42. See Barry v. Barchi, 443 U.S. 55 (1979); Gibson v. Berryhill, 411 U.S. 564 (1973).
The majority noted that Barry v. Barchi and Gibson v. Berryhill contain "analysis and
language strongly suggesting that the Supreme Court does not adhere to a rigid no-exhaustion rule." Id. at 905-06.
43. Compare Ellis v. Dyson, 421 U.S. 426, 432-33 (1975) (exhaustion of state administrative remedy not necessary in § 1983 action) and Steffel v. Thompson, 415 U.S. 452, 47273 (1974) (Congress established federal judiciary as protector of constitutional rights and
thus no requirement to exhaust state administrative remedies) and Damico v. California,
389 U.S. 416, 417 (1967) (per curiam) (relief under Civil Rights Act may be sought first in
federal court) with Patsy v. Florida Int'l Univ., 634 F.2d 900, 905 (5th Cir. 1981) (Supreme
Court has suggested it does not adhere to rigid no exhaustion rule), cert. granted, 50
U.S.L.W. 3213 (U.S. Oct. 6, 1981) (No. 80-1874).
44. 443 U.S. 55, 63 n.10 (1979) (issue of adequacy identical to merits of suit).
45. See Patsy v. Florida Int'l Univ. 634 F.2d 900, 905 (5th Cir. 1981), cert. granted, 50
U.S.L.W. 3213 (U.S. Oct. 6, 1981) (No. 80-1874) (construing Barry v. Barchi, 443 U.S. 55, 63
n.10 (1979)).
46. See Barry v. Barchi, 443 U.S. 55-75 (1979) (exhaustion regarding § 1983 suits not
addressed as constitutional infirmity in administrative law).
47. 411 U.S. 564 (1973).
48. See id. at 574-75. The Court stated it held in the past that exhaustion of state
administrative remedies is not required in section 1983 actions, but then added "whether
this is invariably the case . . . is a question we need not now decide .... Id. at 574-75.
49. See Ellis v. Dyson, 421 U.S. 426, 432-33 (1975); Steffel v. Thompson, 415 U.S. 452,
472-73 (1974); Damico v. California, 389 U.S. 416, 416-17 (1967); McNeese v. Board of
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By requiring exhaustion in section 1983 cases, the United States Court
of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit has usurped the legislative authority of
Congress and, in so doing, has neglected the major purpose for the enactment of the Civil Rights Act of 1871-uniform enforcement of the provisions of the fourteenth amendment.50 To effectuate this aim, federal and
state remedies must be coextensive and permit the civil rights litigant a
choice of forum." Permitting litigants to bypass state remedies and pursue available federal remedies allows federal courts to fulfill their role as
the paramount "guarantor[s] of basic federal rights." 52 Patsy, however,
effectively precludes the federal judiciary from protecting citizens from
state infringement of federal rights by requiring that questions of constitutional magnitude be initially deferred to state forums. " Further, the
uniformity required in section 1983 decisions will only be realized
through federal court rulings." Civil rights causes must be advanced in
the federal forum because the federal judiciary is less likely to be influenced by community pressures than a local state office.55

Educ., 373 U.S. 668, 671 (1963).
50. See, e.g., Mitchum v. Foster, 407 U.S. 225, 238 (1972) (§ 1 of the Civil Rights Act of
1871 enacted to enforce fourteenth amendment); Monroe v. Pape, 365 U.S. 167, 171 (1961)
(purpose of Act was to enforce the provisions of the fourteenth amendment); CONG. GLOBE,
42d Cong. 1st Sess. 83-85 (1871) (Senator Edmunds stating Civil Rights Act carries out
powers of fourteenth amendment).
51. See McNeese v. Board of Educ., 373 U.S. 668, 671 (1963) (relief under Civil Rights
Act not defeated because state remedy not sought first); Monroe v. Pape, 365 U.S. 167, 183
(1961) (state remedies need not be exhausted before resort to federal remedies).
52. Mitchum v. Foster, 407 U.S. 225, 242 (1972) (federal courts "guardians of people's
rights"); See Ex Parte Virginia, 100 U.S. 339, 346 (1880) (Congressional prohibitions on
state power used to restrict state actions); Landry v. Daley, 288 F. Supp. 200, 223 (N.D. Ill.
1968) (§ 1983 places national govern~ment between states and people).
53. Compare Patsy v. Florida Int'l Univ., 634 F.2d 900, 905 (5th Cir. 1981), cert.
granted, 50 U.S.L.W. 3213 (U.S. Oct. 6, 1981) (No. 80-1874) (exhaustion of administrative
remedies required unless traditional exception found) with Steffel v. Thompson, 415 U.S.
452, 472-73 (1974) (Congress established federal judiciary protector of constitutional rights
thus no need to exhaust state administrative remedies) and McNeese v. Board of Educ., 373
U.S. 668, 671 (1963) (relief under Civil Rights Act not defeated because state remedy not
pursued first) and Monroe v. Pape, 365 U.S. 167, 183 (1961) (federal remedy co-extensive
with state remedy; civil rights plaintiff may choose forum).
54. See Basista v. Weir, 340 F.2d 74, 86 (3d Cir. 1965) (without uniformity purpose of
Civil Rights Act could not be realized); Wright v. McMann, 257 F. Supp. 739, 746 (N.D.N.Y.
1966) (benefits of Civil Rights Act not to vary from state to state). See generally Comment,
Exhaustion of State Administrative Remedies Under the Civil Rights Act, 8 IND. L. REV.
565, 588 (1975).
. 55. See, e.g., Palmore v. United States, 411 U.S. 389, 412 (1972) (Douglas, J., dissenting) (life tenure safeguards judge from external pressures); Chicago Council of Lawyers v.
Bauer, 522 F.2d 242, 257 (7th Cir. 1975) (life tenure sufficient to insulate judges from public
opinion); United States v. Montanez, 371 F.2d 79, 84 n.17 (2d Cir. 1967) (federal judges
independent of outside influence because of life tenure).
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CASENOTES

In Patsy, the Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit abandons the well
reasoned no-exhaustion rule established by the Supreme Court in section
1983 actions.5 6 Consequently, the Patsy decision erodes the congressional
aim of the Civil Rights Act of 1871 to interpose the federal courts between the states and their citizens to ensure even application of federal
safeguards."7 Civil rights litigants, therefore, will no longer be permited
unrestrained access to a neutral forum, but must pursue avenues controlled by agencies more likely to render judgements influenced by local
biases.
Russell W. Heald

56. See, e.g., Ellis v. Dyson, 421 U.S. 426, 432-33 (1975) (long settled rule that exhaustion of state remedies not prerequisite to § 1983 actions); Steffel v. Thompson, 415 U.S. 452,
472-73 (1974) (exhaustion not required in § 1983 actions because federal courts protecting
constitutional rights); Wilwording v. Swenson, 404 U.S. 249, 251-52 (1971) (per curiam) (relief under Civil Rights Act not subject to exhaustion requirements).
57. See Mitchum v. Foster, 407 U.S. 225, 242 (1972) (Congress established federal
courts as protector of constitutional rights); Monroe v. Pape, 365 U.S. 167, 173-74 (1961)
(Civil Rights Act of 1871 provides federal remedy where state remedy inadequate); Ex Porte
Virginia, 100 U.S. 339, 346 (1880) (Congressional prohibitions on state power used to curtail
state action).
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